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Over the last few decades, theoretical discussions about metaphors have 
appeared with increasing frequency in the literature and, during the last fifteen years or 
so, such discussions have became more and more common in the methodology of 
economics. But what exactly is a metaphor? According to a tradition which dates back 
to Aristotle,ii a metaphor is the attribution to one object, A, of the name (and indirectly 
of the qualities) of another object, B, while this name or these qualities do not properly 
or normally belong to A. Thus, a metaphor is present when a term used to describe (or 
even to name) A is a term which is already commonly used to name B (quite a different 
kind of entity). Defined in such a way, one must admit that metaphors are frequently 
found in economics as well as in other sciences. Let us consider, for example, a term 
like "elasticity" which is extensively used by economists. According to the ordinary 
dictionary definition, this word designates a property of bodies by which they recover 
their initial form after having been submitted to a pressure; in a less technical sense, it 
refers to the flexibility of some bodies or to their responsiveness to pressures. Thus, 
Marshall was resorting to a metaphor when, in his analysis of demand (which is far 
from being a body), he used the term to describe the property according to which "the 
amount demanded increases much or little for a given fall in price, and diminishes 
much or little for a given rise in price" (Marshall, 1920, p. 86). It is through semantic 
transfers of this kind that the vocabulary of the various sciences have been 
progressively extended with the help of metaphors. 
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The abundance of such examples of metaphors in economics (equilibrium, 
friction, liquidity, circulation, depression, etc.) has been strongly emphasised by 
Donald McCloskey in The Rhetoric of Economics.iii This new interest in metaphors in 
economics was preceded by twenty years of considerable attention to the topic among 
philosophers and literary critics. One of the most influential contributions to the 
analysis of metaphor was made by the philosopher Max Black who developed what he 
called the interaction view of metaphor. According to this view, a metaphor is an 
interactive process involving both a "principal subject" and a "subsidiary subject". In 
this process, the latter is projected on the former and the two are associated with each 
other by what Black calls a "system of implications". (Black, 1962, pp. 38-47) The two 
domains which are put into relation this way are described as influencing each other in 
such a way that each one becomes "a lens for seeing the other".iv According to this 
view, our way of seeing elastic bodies as well as demand would be changed in some 
fashion through the adoption by economists of the word "elasticity" to describe demand 
sensitivity to prices. It is this approach to metaphors that explicitly inspired 
McCloskey, especially in his discussion of Gary Becker's metaphorical system of 
concepts associated with human capital: "In the phrase 'human capital' the field in 
economics treating human skills was at a stroke unified with the field treating 
investment in machines. Thought in both fields was improved[...]" (McCloskey, 1985, 
p. 77). Be that as it may, metaphors being only one among various devices resorted to
by traditional rhetoric to persuade people by making ideas more attractive, McCloskey 
invoked a host of various kinds of examples to develop the thesis according to which 
economics is a rhetorical enterprise akin to literature and poetry. This emphasis on the 
literary character of economics looked so convincing in the circles influenced by 
McCloskey's view that it became more and more common to characterise economic 
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theories as narratives — a genre in which the use of metaphors seems to be quite 
congenial — or more simply as stories, which are normally said to be "good" or "bad" 
rather than true or false. In any case, whatever its links with storytelling and even with 
other tropes resorted to by traditional rhetoric, the notion of metaphor understood in a 
relatively broad sense became a kind of banner for this rhetorical movement.  
It was in this context that Philip Mirowski published his oft-cited book More 
Heat than Light denouncing the way neoclassical economics, according to him, was 
born from the borrowing of the whole theoretical structure of XIXth century 
energetics.v Without endorsing all McCloskey's claims, Mirowski presented this 
systematic application of a conceptual structure borrowed from physics to economics 
as the founding metaphor of neoclassical economics. Given the fact that Mirowski did 
substantial albeit controversial work to document his thesis, the very idea that 
metaphor was a fundamental but suspicious element in the constitution of economics 
was considerably reinforced. Typically enough, when Arjo Klamer and Thomas C. 
Leonard in a paper devoted to the nature of economic metaphors referred to 
"constitutive metaphors", characterised by them as the most fundamental type of 
metaphors met in economics, they turned to the central metaphor discussed in More 
Heat Than Light to illustrate what they meant (Klamer & Leonard, 1994, p. 41). Be 
that as it may, during the nineties, the idea that metaphor is the key element of 
economic theories has apparently gained considerable audience among a number of 
methodologists of economics who seem to feel comfortable with the idea that economic 
theories are nothing but extended metaphors born from the attribution to economic 
objects of qualities and structures previously pertaining to different contexts.  





If all this were the case, economic theory would face a serious problem that can 
be put in the following way. Traditionally, an economic theory was seen both as a 
rational and precise explanation of a phenomenon and as an explanation which could 
be criticised on logical and empirical grounds; ultimately, it makes sense to test a 
theory in order to make a judgement about its truth or falsity. It is not as clear that 
metaphors can be criticised on a logical basis or be put to the test. More precisely, they 
tend to discourage attempts to discuss them on the basis of logical or empirical analyses 
and, for this reason, it hardly sounds reasonable to declare them either true or false. It 
would be odd, for example, to test whether it is true or false that the working of the 
market is guided by an invisible hand — possibly the most venerable metaphor 
associated with an economic theory — just like it would be absurd to test the truth or 
falsity of the proposition according to which Adam Smith is the father of economics. 
While metaphors of this kind can be evaluated on various grounds (aptness, relevance, 
clarity, insightfulness, etc.), the point is that in such an evaluation considerations based 
on logic and on empirical adequacy tend to be overshadowed by considerations related 
to rhetoric (are they persuasive?) and to literary quality (are they good stories?). We 
will see later in this paper that even when their metaphorical content is acknowledged, 
theories can still be tested for what they are, but once theories are more or less 
assimilated to metaphors, it is tempting to conclude that, even if they provide 
suggestive explanations of phenomena, it would be totally inappropriate to assess them 
purely on a logical or empirical basis.  
 
One could object that metaphors might have a useful role in economics as 
pedagogical or heuristic devices without discrediting theories which are quite different 
animals: theories aim to say exactly what things are whereas metaphors only give an 
idea of the structure of these things by referring to something else which is structurally 





comparable. But such a distinction would be deceptive, since theories — even theories 
in the natural sciences (see Hesse, 1972 and Cartwright, 1983) — do not say exactly 
what things are. For example, it is far from being literally true that consumers are units 
which always decide by maximising their utility or that firms are units which are 
managed in such a way that their marginal revenue is equated to their marginal costs. 
Just like the various hydraulic and electronic analogies which have been devised to 
illustrate "metaphorically" their main principles, economic theories help us to better 
understand some structural features of consumer behaviour or of competitive markets 
but in no way do they describe exactly the way things are. 
 
 But if this is the case, what is the difference between theory and metaphor? 
Moreover, if metaphors are so pervasive in the theoretical language of economics and 
if economic theories are not radically different from analogical models which are 
commonly said to be "metaphorical", what is left of the methodological claims which 
are usually associated with scientific theories? According to those who have associated 
themselves with the rhetorical movement, the "metaphorical" character of economics 
should considerably affect our methodological views about theories. Indeed, for 
McCloskey, there is no point in developing any methodological analysis of economics 
because rhetoric, which "deals with conversation", is "a better way to understand 
science" (1985, p. 28), given that "good science is good conversation" (1985, p. 26) or 
even genuine poetry. Defending similar views, Klamer and Leonard do not hesitate to 
blame "scientific minded economists" who are offended "when McCloskey equates 
economics with poetry because it too relies on metaphors" (1994, p. 20); according to 
them, the pervasive and subversive character of metaphors in economics should force 
economists to adopt an attitude quite different from those suggested by most 
philosophers of economics. In fact, in the writings of the rhetorical school, it is difficult 





to identify what could count as technical arguments against the most common 
methodological theses about economics. Rather, what seems to be prevalent in this 
literature is the idea that, once the significance of metaphors is fully acknowledged, 
maintaining those methodological theses becomes pointless since they must finally give 
way to more relevant literary and rhetorical considerations. 
 
It is this claim that I would like to challenge. While a comprehensive analysis 
of the rhetorical school approach should discuss its views on the role of narratives and 
of various other ways to persuade in economics, the present paper will be limited to 
challenging this claim to the extent that it rests on the importance of metaphors in 
economics. Towards this end, I will argue that such a claim loses its relevance when 
one considers (1) that everything which is not to be clearly understood literally is not 
necessarily metaphorical, (2) that almost all metaphors used in economics are dead 
metaphors which no longer work as metaphors, and (3) that so-called metaphors must 
be clearly disentangled from explicit analogies which are methodologically much more 
acceptable. Before taking sides against the rhetorical challenge of conventional 
methodological theories I must add, however, that I am fully aware that standard 
questions concerning truth, objectivity, explanation and proof raise considerable 
epistemological problems which have been extensively discussed in the context of 
scientific theory in general, whatever its metaphorical content. It is not my aim in this 
paper to speak to these epistemological problems nor to deny their importance. Instead, 
I wish to make the far more limited claim that very little is added to them when the 
metaphorical character of theories are brought into the picture. Similarly, my intention 
is not to deny the existence of significant epistemological differences between the 
natural and social sciences, but since metaphors are present in both, I maintain that 
such differences are not linked to the presence of metaphors as such. 








This is not a metaphor 
 
Let us consider more carefully what the claim of those who emphasise the 
pervasiveness of metaphors in economics consists in. For example, Klamer and 
Leonard observe that "the most celebrated metaphor in economics" is a Marshall cross 
representing, for example, a labour market (Klamer & Leonard, 1994, p. 23). While it 
is a bit odd to present as a metaphor what is a representation rather than an utterance, 
these authors are right to suggest that Marshall's way of representing the interaction in 
a market of buyers' and sellers' respective propensities with the help of two intersecting 
curves can generate utterances which can hardly be called "literally true". For example, 
the sentence "Here, we have our market for labour" spoken by an economist in 
reference to a cross on a blackboard can hardly be true if each word is taken in its 
literal sense since there is a cross on the blackboard but not a market. To be sure, this 
cross is materially quite different from the market that it represents, but is any such 
representation necessarily metaphorical? And in what sense exactly should this 
sentence be taken non literally? Answering these questions requires some clarification 
of the meaning of both literalness and representation. 
 
Defining the word "literal" is not an easy thing. The philosopher John Searle 
(1979, p. 94) has gone so far as to claim that "to give an accurate account of literal 
predication is an extremely difficult, complex, and subtle problem". According to the 
Oxford English Dictionary, this word — if we ignore the meanings which do not apply 
to the present context — originates in theological exegesis where literal interpretations 





were opposed to mystical or to allegorical ones. More commonly, it refers to the 
relatively primary sense of a word "as distinguished from any metaphorical or 
suggested sense". Thus, the word can hardly be defined otherwise than by excluding 
what is metaphorical and, one must surely add, what is dependent on other tropes. For 
example, an understatement, an exaggeration or an ironical utterance must not be 
literally understood. In a less indirect fashion, the word "literal" might tentatively be 
defined as referring to the primary sense of an utterance or as referring to the purely 
conventional meaning of the words (see Sadok, 1979). In any case, various authors 
have underscored the fact that there is no hard and fast boundary between "literal" and 
"metaphorical" (Sadok 1979; Rumelhart, 1979; Cornell Way, 1991, ch. 1). There is so 
little hope to give to the word "literal" a standard definition that Eileen Cornell Way 
concludes her analysis of the question by claiming: "The function of 'literal' is not to 
contribute positively to the characterisation of anything, but to exclude possible ways 
of being non-literal." (Cornell Way, 1991, p. 20) 
 
 If such is the case, it becomes difficult to decide whether or not a 
representation that is not associated with tropes should be taken literally. If one 
represents the orbit of a planet with the help of an ellipse on a blackboard, it seems 
reasonable to say that one represents it literally. Let us note however that, in this case, 
the ellipse on the blackboard does not solely represent but rather exemplifies an 
ellipse: the drawn ellipse is literally an ellipse, it has the essential features of an ellipse, 
whereas the cross does not in the same sense exemplify a market. In fact, the ellipse is 
an abstract entity which can be materialised in a drawing, but this is far from being 
typical of most representations. For example, a material object which is represented by 
its image is not exemplified in the same sense by this image. This situation is at the 
source of the paradoxical inscription "This is not a pipe" that the painter Magritte 





placed at the bottom of his famous painting unequivocally representing a pipe. Indeed, 
by contrast with the representation of the ellipse, the image of the pipe does not 
exemplify what it represents and does not possess the most essential feature of a pipe, 
namely the capacity of being used to smoke.vi But the notion of representation is still 
more complex. Let us consider a map on which a mountain is represented through a set 
of contour curves. Since many features (size, matter, colour, etc. ) of the set of curves 
are totally different from the corresponding features of the mountain represented, this 
set of curves does not exemplify a mountain or, if one prefers, literally speaking is not 
a mountain. However, some of its features exemplify some features of the actual 
mountain, in particular the curves on the map exemplify the kind of curves which are 
running at constant levels of the mountain. Therefore, while it would not be literally 
true to say that the set of curves on the map is a mountain, it might be literally true to 
say that these curves have been designed in such a way that their shapes are more or 
less exactly the same (at a different scale) as those of the curves running at various 
levels of the mountain.  
 
The Marshall cross corresponds to a still more complicated case of 
representation. The crossing curves represent a market, but it does not seem possible to 
say that any feature of the cross exemplifies any single feature of the market. More 
precisely, the curves represent respectively propensities to buy or to sell according to a 
given price, but they do not exemplify such propensities. At most, one could possibly 
claim that it is literally true that a specific mathematical relation between the (vertical 
and horizontal) positions of each of their points on a graph exemplify the complex 
relation which prevails between prices and (indirectly) observed propensities to buy or 
to sell at such and such a price. Given the complexity of such a relationship, it is 
understandable that one is tempted to say that standard utterances referring to such a 





cross should not be taken too literally. However, even if a comparison — in this case, 
between some properties of geometrical figures and those of trader's propensities — is 
involved, in all these cases of representation, there is, strictly speaking, no metaphor 
(nor even metonymy), unless one refers to the set of contours as if it were a mountain 
or to the cross on the blackboard as if it were a market. In fact, economists often refer 
to the "law of downward sloping demand" or claim that "the demand moves to the 
right" as if the demand itself had the properties of a geometric figure. Such utterances 
are clearly metaphorical since they attribute to demand features pertaining to 
geometric curves, but it is not the cross as a geometrical representation that is a 
metaphor. At most, given the boldness of the implied comparison between the 
respective properties of the cross and those of the market, one can speak of a 
"metaphor", but only in the broad sense of the word that is often harmlessly used in 
contexts where the important distinction between metaphor and comparison is not 
relevant. Be that as it may, since it would involve an unproductive and absurd 
acrobatics for economists to restrain themselves to words taken in their most primitive 
and conventional sense and to restrict themselves to using complex sentences which 
could be said to be literally true in the sense illustrated above, Klamer and Leonard 
have no trouble suggesting that most significant claims of economists should not be 
taken literally. And since they tend to characterise as metaphorical anything which is 
not literal, they have no trouble suggesting that economics is full of metaphors and that 
it is at best "metaphorically" true. 
 
In fact, members of the rhetorical movement tend not only to find a metaphor 
in each case of an utterance that can not be characterised as unequivocally literal but 
also to conflate the use of metaphors and that of abstract concepts. For example, when 
it comes to explaining that "economics itself 'leaves out' some features of the truth" 





(McCloskey, 1985, p. 82), McCloskey attributes this fact to metaphors since they 
emphasise only a selection of traits. Even if it is common to attribute such a reductive 
selection of traits to the process of abstraction necessarily engaged in by economists, 
McCloskey typically enough prefers to detect a metaphor, a trope usually associated 
with literature and poetry rather than invoking abstraction, a process usually associated 
with scientific research. For their part, Klamer and Leonard say that "Space is 
Euclidean and can be thought of only with the metaphor of lines and points..." (Klamer 
& Leonard, p. 40), but it is difficult to see in what sense space and lines have to be 
understood metaphorically in a Euclidean context. It is true that Euclid, when referring 
to pure lines (that is, lines without breadth), did not refer to the type of lines that 
people ordinarily have in mind, but it is in no way with the help of a metaphor 
borrowed from another area of knowledge that he has forced the usual meaning of the 
word "line" to construct an abstract concept. It is correct to oppose "metaphorical" to 
"literal", but this opposition is not the same and so should not be confused with the 
opposition between what is abstract and what is concrete. After all, if by "metaphors" 
one loosely refers to standard ingredients of any scientific theory like representation, 
idealisation and abstraction, no one would have any reason to be bothered by the fact 
that "economics is full of metaphors". 
 
Dead Metaphors in Economics 
 
Thus, if the word "metaphor" were itself taken in a more "literal" sense, then 
metaphors would be perceived as much less pervasive in economics, but this is not to 
say that they are not present and even abundant. But what are the implications of this 
fact and to what extent do these implications have a subversive impact on economics? 
According to Klamer and Leonard, the most crucial implications arise when, alongside 





pedagogical and heuristic metaphors, we refer to what they call "constitutive" 
metaphors which frame our very way of thinking. When it comes to exploring an 
unknown domain, one has to resort to conceptual schemes which are often borrowed 
from a more familiar sector of knowledge. Since these conceptual schemes will tend to 
frame, and consequently to influence decisively the whole development of the analysis 
of this domain, the authors characterise them as "constitutive", and since they tend to 
classify as metaphorical any borrowing of conceptual schemes, they call them 
"constitutive metaphors". After presenting Mirowski's "energetic metaphor" as possibly 
the most significant constitutive metaphor, they claim that "metaphors" of this type can 
frame our way of thinking and suggest to us ways of organising ideas and forging new 
categories. To substantiate their point, they refer to Stephen Pepper's four "world 
hypotheses", each of which is based on a "root metaphor": organicism, mechanism, 
formism and contextualism, respectively.vii According to Klamer and Leonard, tracking 
down the metaphorical origin (organicist, mechanicist or otherwise) of interpretations 
adopted by economists could be significantly helpful in clarifying the source of some 
of the disagreements between them. It is true that one could object that such an analysis 
could hardly be of great help with respect to fundamental epistemological 
disagreements about the proper way to assess theories; however, let us admit that the 
authors have in mind nothing other than disagreements about the proper way to 
conceptualise economic phenomena. 
 
To get a better handle on the implications of this approach, let us consider the 
case, documented by Timothy Alborn (1994), of a situation which seems to correspond 
to such a disagreement generated by conflicting metaphors. Alborn describes the 
conflation in Victorian monetary economics of a biological image (the circulation of 
blood in the body) and a mechanical one (that of steam in an engine). Everyone agrees 





that money circulates in the economy, but depending on the way we think of it 
circulating, either like blood or like steam, we can be driven towards quite different 
conclusions.viii But this situation is not overly dramatic, since we may simply consider 
that money actually circulates neither like blood nor like steam but like money. An 
immediate objection to this consideration would be that money does not circulate at all 
except metaphorically, and that this "metaphor", as illustrated by Alborn's paper on 
Victorian economics, is either organicist or mechanicist. After all, money is not a fluid 
which could literally circulate through veins or pipes. It is true that we frequently refer 
to "liquid money", but this is even more clearly metaphorical, so clearly so, in fact, that 
as Klamer and Leonard observe, we do not feel threatened by the idea that liquid assets 
might be frozen when transported to Alaska (1994, p. 23). However, if this 
consideration illustrates fairly well that the expressions "liquid money" or "liquid 
assets" have a metaphorical origin and that they should not be taken "literally", it also 
illustrates that the metaphor from which it originates is at present totally dead and that 
the sentence no longer works metaphorically. The very fact that no economist would be 
naive enough to have in mind any kind of genuine liquid when referring to liquid assets 
shows that the word "liquid" has been given a new (economic) meaning. Similarly, the 
word "circulation" has a very long time ago received a larger meaning according to 
which "taking different forms and being successively owned by different persons until 
returning to a similar position" is a perfectly acceptable way to circulate. Consequently, 
money no longer circulates metaphorically; it circulates literally. 
 
If this were not the case, then one would have to claim that water circulates 
metaphorically as well. Indeed, we do not need to push the etymological analysis very 
far to discover that "to circulate" means "to describe a circle". But water almost never 
describes circles when it circulates; therefore it circulates only metaphorically. 





However, to say that water circulates or to say that money circulates is, in both cases, 
to use a word born of one of those dead metaphors which are at the source of 
innumerable standard words of any language. If they wanted to suggest that theories 
should not be taken literally, Klamer and Leonard overshoot the mark, because the 
metaphorical language they refer to is so pervasive that it corresponds to a rather 
common language that cannot significantly be contrasted to a less metaphorical one. 
Like so many utterances in everyday language which can be declared metaphorical in 
this loose sense for being associated with a dead metaphor, these economic utterances 
have to be understood literally, because, in such conditions, to understand by virtue of 
a (dead) metaphor is more or less the same thing as to understand literally.ix As Max 
Black said: "A so-called dead metaphor is not a metaphor at all, but purely an 
expression that no longer has a pregnant metaphorical use. A competent reader is not 
expected to recognise such a familiar expression as “falling in love” as a metaphor, to 
be taken au grand sérieux. Indeed, it is doubtful whether that expression was ever more 
than a case of catachresis (using an idiom to fill a gap in the lexicon)".x Since such 
dead metaphors have become fully-fledged parts of plain language, it is not with literal 
utterances that they should be contrasted but rather with live metaphors. 
 
Thus, the next question to raise is: "What would it imply for a metaphor to be 
live and not dead?" A metaphor is live when, to use Nelson Goodman's apt 
characterisation, it can "be regarded as a calculated category-mistake".xi Alternatively, 
one can say with Monroe Beardsley that a live metaphor involves a kind of "logical 
opposition" which shocks the reader and contributes to the creation of a new meaning 
(1972, pp. 73-91). A live metaphor has to do violence to common meanings and 
describe a phenomenon in a shocking fashion, using categories normally applicable 
only to quite different phenomena. Thus poetic metaphors are typically live. When one 





reads the Odyssey, one still visualises rosy fingers, almost three millennia since Homer 
first described dawn with the help of this metaphor. This metaphor was a strange and 
not very logical way to emphasise the beauty of something which could have been 
designated otherwise (pink strips in the sky visible at dawn) but whose concrete 
richness and magnificence is too quickly forgotten without the help of such a 
metaphor, which continues thus to be live after centuries. At a much less poetical level, 
when an advertisement says that I should "put a tiger in my tank", the metaphor is live 
because "tiger" is not yet the standard name of a kind of gasoline, but it rather points to 
an unexpected association which is deemed to be appealing enough to capture the 
imagination of drivers. By contrast, most economic metaphors are dead metaphors 
because they are nothing but practical ways of designating phenomena which could not 
be designated in more literal words, such as a particular form taken by money 
(liquidity) or the phenomenon by which money, through free exchange, is able to 
return to its original point (circulation). Once the new name is accepted and integrated 
into the common parlance of economists, the metaphor is quickly forgotten and the 
phenomenon is understood for what it is. When economists refer to liquid money, they 
do not refer to a substance similar to water; when they refer to the circulation of 
money, they do not mean that money flows inside pipes or veins. Consequently, it can 
be literally true or false that money circulates in the economy because the question at 
hand is whether it circulates (according to the only meaning appropriate for money) or 
not.  
 
Thus, since statements made with the help of such dead metaphors can be 
literally true or false, jut like statements made with words in their literal sense, it is 
difficult to see why the metaphorical origin of economic categories can force us to 
revise in a significant way our understanding of the nature of a theory. But what about 





live metaphors met in economics? Let us acknowledge to begin with that they are much 
less abundant than dead metaphors. Most of the examples quoted by McCloskey or by 
Klamer and Leonard (capital, liquidity, elasticity, inflation, depression, accelerator, 
multiplier, etc.) are clearly dead metaphors which, in the mind of economists who use 
them, are understood as technical words and unambiguously defined as if they were not 
metaphorical at all. In fact, there is a reason for the shortage of live metaphors in the 
list provided by these authors. Metaphors which would avoid dying as metaphors by 
being not integrated in the basic vocabulary of economics would be incidental 
metaphors emanating from the colourful imagination of an economist. When, for 
example, an economist refers to the voracity or to the "long teeth" of an aggressive 
entrepreneur, he is clearly using live metaphors but these metaphors would not be 
representative of economics as a science and would be quite inessential to the structure 
of economic theories. Consequently, such metaphors would be quickly forgotten by 
contrast with Homer's "rosy fingers" which is an essential element of a great piece of 
poetry.xii Apparent exceptions to this rule are Smith's "invisible hand" and Keynes's 
"animal spirits". Both are live metaphors that are still as evocative as literary 
metaphors, but, being metaphors of this type, they are not ingredients of economic 
theories as such. There is no longer room for an invisible hand or for animal spirits 
when it comes to exposing technically the theory of a competitive market or the theory 
of the marginal efficiency of capital. Either metaphorical terms play a significant role 
in economic theories, but then they are dead metaphors which no longer have, to use 
Black's words, "a pregnant metaphorical use" or they are live metaphors and they are 
perfectly dispensable from the point of view of economic theory.  
 
A more complicated case is that of the concept of human capital whose 
"metaphorical" application to children by Gary Becker was taken as a sort of 





paradigmatic example by Klamer and Leonard (1994, pp. 32-33) as well as by 
McCloskey (1985, pp. 74-79). An example equally to the point is the application by the 
same economist of the market concept to various sociological situations like the choice 
of partnership in marriage and the determination of the number of children, which 
incidentally offers a case of exportation of economic concepts towards other sciences 
by contrast to the importation referred to by Mirowski. Be that as it may, given the still 
controversial character of Becker's view within the academic community, it would be 
difficult to claim that these "metaphors" are nothing but dead metaphors filling a gap in 
the common vocabulary; nonetheless they play a crucial role in Becker's theory. Before 
discussing this case, however, we must consider the difference between metaphors and 
analogies and the relation between analogies and economic models.  
 
Models, Analogies and Metaphors  
 
If economists who are acquainted with these methodological debates seem not 
to have been disturbed by the widespread reference to metaphors in recent literature, it 
is largely due to the fact that they are accustomed to models even more than to theories. 
In fact, economists have in mind the theoretical models that they use to represent some 
structural aspect of the economic world.xiii For example, they refer to models of the 
firm or to general equilibrium models. Through such theoretical models, economists 
represent, in a more or less schematic fashion, interrelations which they consider 
significant for the understanding of a sector of the economic world. They do not 
pretend that such models depict faithfully what is going on in this world. They do not 
pretend that flesh-and-blood entrepreneurs systematically hire or fire workers any time 
such moves allow their marginal cost to come closer to their marginal revenue. Some 
methodologists would even say with Daniel Hausman that models in the sense given to 





this word by economists "are definitions and are constituted by sets of assumptions" 
(Hausman, 1992, p. 75). According to Hausman, it is even "a category mistake to ask 
whether they are true or to attempt to test them" (1992, p. 78). One can disagree with 
Hausman's radical view on this point, but it remains somewhat ambiguous to declare 
plainly true or false so many economic models which have been designed to explore 
conceptual relations like those involved in a general equilibrium on a highly theoretical 
kind of market. From this point of view, such models share with metaphors the 
character of being not immediately reducible to literal assertions about the world. It is 
true that, at some point, economists will normally apply them to the relevant sector of 
the world, but this will be done only with the help of supplementary hypotheses whose 
role it is to adapt the model to such an application. The fact that such economic models 
are not taken as literal assertions about the world is made still more manifest when one 
considers that some economists have developed electronic or hydraulic models in order 
to visualise structural relations which are equivalent to those highlighted by these 
theoretical models. Models of this kind, which provide a concrete image of the abstract 
relations involved and which therefore are sometimes called "iconic" models, have 
often been presented as "metaphorical" interpretations of the theory.xiv 
 
To make the present discussion more concrete, let us consider an "iconic" (or 
"analogue") model of this type which has been constructed by a well known economist. 
A. W. H. Phillips designed an hydraulic model in order to illustrate his Keynesian 
approach to a theory of monetary flow (Phillips, 1950). At first glance, this model 
seems to have properties similar to those of a metaphor. However, when discussing the 
analogy on which it is based, the question at hand is clearly not whether it is true or 
false that the money involved in repeated exchanges is nothing but water flowing 
through pipes, but rather whether it is sensible to compare the circulation of money to 





the circulation of water. But is it appropriate to treat such models as metaphors? 
Strictly speaking, they are not metaphors, but analogical constructions. But are not 
analogies metaphors of some kind? Klamer and Leonard claim that they are; according 
to them, an analogy is "a sustained and systematically elaborated metaphor" (1994, p. 
45). Before them, Mirowski also blurred the differences between metaphors and 
analogies. Indeed, in More Heat than Light, to illustrate that "scientific reasoning is 
metaphorical", he found it appropriate to quote Duhem saying that "the history of 
physics shows us that the search for analogies between two distinct categories of 
phenomena has perhaps been the surest and most fruitful method of all the procedures 
put into play in the construction of physical theories." (quoted by Mirowski, 1989, p. 
277-278, my emphasis). But Duhem chose the word "analogies" because analogies are 
not metaphors. Analogies can be defined as sustained similes but not as "sustained 
metaphors". When a metaphor is "sustained", one should rather refer to it as an 
allegory.xv An analogy is to a simile what an allegory is to a metaphor. A metaphor is 
the attribution to one object of the name (or the qualities) of another whereas an 
analogy is an explicit comparison (a sustained simile) between two domains, a 
comparison that has the virtue of pointing out a range of functional similarities between 
the two domains. Far from indulging in a "calculated category-mistake" or doing 
violence to logic, the author of an analogy systematically underscores the respective 
characters of these two domains in such a way that their distinctiveness is explicitly 
preserved. These distinctions between metaphor, simile, allegory and analogy are 
important because whereas metaphors and allegory are poetical and essentially 
suggestive literary tropes, simile and analogy are analytic exercises which are perfectly 
suited to scientific analysis.xvi When the question at stake concerns the nature of 
theories — their openness to logical criticism, testing and verification or falsification 
— it is important to keep in mind that associating theories with metaphors might sound 





much more dangerously subversive than associating them with similes or analogies. By 
violating what logic requires, a genuine or live metaphor attributes to an entity 
properties which do not normally belong to it, whereas an analogy is an explicit and 
systematic comparison between two different entities.  
 
For example, a valve in an hydraulic model can play a function similar to that 
of a price increase in economics: both will tend reduce the flow either of water or of 
money.xvii No doubt that such analogies — as is the case with so many linguistic 
operations — imply metaphors and, as we can see in this example, analogies can be 
built by awakening dormant metaphors like the one from which the word "flow" as 
used in economics was born. Since the very notion of a "flow" of money has a 
metaphorical origin, why not check whether or not the mechanism which explains the 
behaviour of money is functionally similar to the mechanism which explains the 
behaviour of water in a system with comparable constraints? As we have seen, it is 
these kinds of analogies that are made manifest by analogical models (hydraulic, 
electronic, etc.) which, like mathematical theoretical models, analyse mechanisms 
potentially at work in the real economic world. Taken as a whole, such models clearly 
rest on an analogy but not on a metaphor. Indeed, they do not indulge in the calculated 
category-mistake which consists in saying (in a doubtfully poetical language) that 
money is conducted through pipes and valves to a reservoir of wealth. Instead, these 
models result from a particularly explicit comparison between the mechanism 
suspected to be at work in the economic world and the one at work in the hydraulic 
machine involved. 
  
It is true that analogy, in the case of some theoretical models, is used as a tool 
to explore structural relations in a phenomenon. And since all the features which are 





common to both sides of the analogy are not given in advance, such a tool should not 
be considered dispensable. Indeed, a number of these features cannot be known before 
the structure of one domain is applied to the other and this cannot be accomplished in 
absence of some conceptual violence. It is for this reason that Black argues that such 
models are based on metaphors involving the interaction of two structures rather than 
on analogies reducible to comparisons between two previously known structures.xviii 
According to McCloskey, (1985, pp. 74-79) a case in point in economics is the bold 
development by Gary Becker of the analogical potential of Theodore Schultz's famous 
"human capital" metaphor. It is true that all the structural features of capital which can 
be compared to those of children were not known in advance and McCloskey was 
probably right when he observed that, thanks to a Blackian interactive process, thought 
was improved both in labour economics and in capital theory. (1985, p. 77) It is also 
true that the human capital metaphor never really died as a metaphor because its 
emotional content remains shocking for most people, but what else can we conclude 
from this? Once the various features of children that are comparable to those of more 
typical durable goods have been spelled out by Schultz and later by Becker (and judged 
disappointing by many of the theory's critics), it was a systematic analogy between 
durable goods and human beings which was modelled to become the inspiration of the 
human capital theory. A theoretical model was designed with the help of a relatively 
new conceptual apparatus according to which children are a kind of durable goods, just 
like "labour forces" were a kind of saleable goods grown in families in Marxian 
models. Becker does not say that flesh-and-blood parents always take their decisions 
concerning children on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis, nor was Marx naive enough 
to say similar things about workers' families, nor have marginalist economists said that 
actual consumers systematically adjust their baskets of goods according to the slightest 
change in relative prices. All these models are highly abstract constructs that allow the 





exploration of relations between economic variables. Most of them will ultimately be 
put to the test, and when they are, the "metaphorical" or analogical origin of the 
theoretical model is immaterial: the analogical concepts involved are defined with just 
as much precision and technicality as the most literal ones, at least by those who take 
the theory seriously enough to test it. Some might claim that the results of those tests 
are too inconclusive to justify the development of the model, but this is quite a 
different matter. 
 
More typically, in their search for fruitful analogies, economists look outside 
their own science towards different areas of knowledge. The paradigmatic case of such 
a "borrowing" is possibly that involving the adoption by marginalist economists of 
some conceptual structures similar to those of XIXth century energetics, documented 
by Mirowski in his controversial book. What is important for the present discussion is 
not whether marginalist economists have slavishly submitted themselves to the 
conceptual structure developed by physicists as Mirowski claims, but rather that they 
have attempted to apply analogically a mathematical conceptual apparatus which was 
being used in physics to economics.xix It is because this conceptual apparatus familiar to 
physicists was influential in the development of economics that Klamer and Leonard 
describe this "borrowing" as the paradigmatic example of what they consider to be a 
"constitutive metaphor" (1994, p. 41). With apparent legitimacy, one who accepts 
Mirowski's claim can indeed see in such a process a kind of macro-metaphor, since 
according to this view a whole theoretical structure was applied, not without some 
logical violence, to a different science. Moreover, it is true that, "metaphorically" 
moulded into a mathematical apparatus inherited from physics in such a fashion, a 
theory is in a position to raise many new questions which would not have been raised 
had the theory been internally developed without such borrowings.xx The theoretical 





transfer between sciences creates new meanings through a process which is comparable 
with that at work in creative metaphors. But once a theory that has been generated in 
such a fashion finds a new formulation in the science which has benefited from the 
borrowing, it is no longer applied metaphorically to it. Whether or not it has been 
moulded into an apparatus inherited from physics, neoclassical theory remains a theory 
which pretends to explain economic behaviour by applying its categories to economic 
phenomena. Thus, categories generated by a so-called "metaphorical" process — which 
in the minds of the economists who were so fascinated by physics was very likely 
nothing but an explicit analogical process — do not have to be metaphorically applied 
to the sector for which they have been designed.xxi  
 
For the sake of illustration, let us recall that neoclassical economists do not say 
that economic agents maximise their potential energy, they say rather that they 
maximise their utility. There is no category-mistake in such a claim and this claim has 
to be taken literally. As we have seen, authors who have emphasised the role of 
economic metaphors have been exceedingly quick to detect metaphors in every term 
generated by analogical reasoning. For example, Klamer and Leonard ask: "on what 
basis did Paul Samuelson choose optimization as his heuristic metaphor over, say, 
satisficing or chaos?" (1994, p. 41). Even though the authors oddly illustrate their point 
by referring to satisficing and chaos — technical notions which evoke theories which 
were not yet developed when Samuelson coined his concept — their point is that he 
could have had in mind a concept of decision less exacting than optimisation, either a 
concept which requires only the attainment of a certain satisfaction or a concept which 
is based on random. Be that as it may, the only aspect of their view that I would like to 
discuss here is the idea that "optimization" should be considered a metaphor. But, why 
should the use of this word be understood as metaphorical? It is an abstract concept 
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chosen to say that the best (optimal) situation is sought and eventually reached. 
Alternatively, one can describe it as a Weberian ideal-type resulting from the 
stylisation of a process which takes place in the real world but not in the idealised form 
which is evoked by the concept of optimisation. Samuelson and (possibly) other 
economists may have been influenced by mathematical physics when they coined the 
word "optimization" on the model of "maximization", but they have nonetheless 
managed to coin a concept that is meaningful only in a human context since nothing 
can be optimal that is not in relation to human values. Economic decisions but not 
physical processes can literally produce the best possible result. It is true that 
Samuelson defines optimisation in such an abstract and rigorous way that probably no 
human being optimises in this fashion. But when he forces the matter in this way and 
suggests that real people optimise, it would be odd to claim that in saying this he is 
committing a kind of metaphorical category-mistake since only people can optimise at 
all, and since many people actually do manage to optimise at least on some occasions. 
Here again, the concept of a metaphor has been overextended to include the abstract 
and idealised concept of optimisation which is in no way metaphorical. Clearly, if 
"literally true" implies "universally true", it is not literally true that people optimise, 
that people are rational, or that firms equate their marginal cost to their marginal 
revenue, but these banal considerations — which concern the highly abstract character 
of microeconomics — have hardly anything to do with metaphors. The statement 
"people are optimisers" is a literal statement that, depending on one's point of view, 
can be characterised either as approximately true or plainly false. Similarly, to say, for 
example, that the blackboard is flat is not strictly true since the blackboard is only 
approximately flat, but it is not a metaphor since flatness is a property which belongs to 
it in a sufficiently evident way and since there is manifestly no calculated category-
mistake made in saying so.  
25 
In spite of these considerations, though, one can understand why it might be 
tempting to describe optimisation as a metaphor. By adopting a variant of the idea of 
maximisation which was central to the theoretical apparatus of physics, economists are 
led to force the description of economic phenomena to fit into an elegant mathematical 
structure. According to Mirowski, the neoclassical theory of production has been 
significantly distorted because "there was no analogue of production in the energetics 
metaphor" (1989, p. 283). The choice by economists of a particular mathematical 
structure akin to one which has been highly successful in a science as prestigious as 
physics is presented by him as a decisive inducement to extrapolate the whole structure 
of the physical theory to economics and to manipulate the parameters of the concrete 
economic situation in such a way that they fit the structure. One who accepts such a 
view might be inclined to think that economists have applied to the economic world a 
theoretical structure borrowed from physics, in the same way that others have applied 
to any readily spendable money the predicate "liquid", a term borrowed from 
elementary hydraulics. But the difference between these two cases is obvious. In the 
latter, the borrowing is a typical metaphor which implied, at its origin, a calculated 
category-mistake through which a new concept ("liquidity") was created to replace a 
tedious paraphrase when it came to designating an already well-known phenomenon. In 
the former, the borrowing of a mathematical structure developed in another science 
results from a highly suggestive and potentially fruitful analogy which turned out to be 
very helpful in suggesting new theoretical tools. However, such theoretical tools, 
regardless of their origin, must be accepted or rejected on their own merits. Distortion 
might be a temptation, but it is surely not implied by the very fact of analogical 
thinking. If the theory is put to the test, it will be done just as prosaically as with any 
less "metaphorical" one. Suppose that a theory is designed without any influence from 
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any other scientific sector and that it owes nothing to any kind of analogy. Assuming 
that such an autarkic theory is possible, it would meet exactly the same methodological 
problems as would a more "metaphorically based" theory when it comes to applying it 
to its domain and to deciding whether it should be accepted as true or rejected as false. 
There is no reason to think that the analogical origin of the latter will add specific 
difficulties to this already problematic methodological decision. Naturally, it is possible 
that theories based on attractive analogies have a greater chance of orienting the 
analysis in a misleading direction, but if it turns out to be the case, it is not due to the 
subversive effect of some metaphorical category-mistake; it is simply due to the fact 
that any theory which is accepted for its theoretical appeal, rather than for its empirical 
adequacy, has a greater chance of being misleading and deceptive. 
* * * 
The fact that reliance on analogies can, in some circumstances, be misleading 
and deceptive is precisely what makes critical analysis of theoretical transfers between 
sciences significant to the history of economic thought. The point of the present paper 
was not to assess or to endorse an enterprise like Mirowski's, which explicitly aim to 
contribute to this kind of critical analysis. However, it is difficult to deny that, if well 
grounded, any attempt to trace out the possible distortions in an economic theory 
caused by too slavishly submitting to an attractive analogy might be a fruitful result of 
a critical history of economic thought. As underscored by James Bernard Murphy, "all 
analogies have implications that can distort theory if the analogies are not subject to 
criticism" (Murphy, 1994, p. 543). And as illustrated by Camille Limoges and Claude 
Ménard's analysis of Marshall's thought, economists sometimes have to step back in 
order to avoid the "unbearable consequences" entailed by their adoption of structuring 
analogies from the natural sciences (Limoges & Ménard, 1994, p. 349). However, this 
27 
last case illustrates fairly well that economists are not necessarily slavishly committed 
to an analogy, but since it is not clear that they always "step back" in such situations, 
critical but careful analyses of the way metaphors and analogical transfers have 
influenced their thought should be particularly welcomed. The claim of this paper was 
that to attain the beneficial results of such critical analyses, it is in no way necessary to 
inflate the meaning of "metaphor" in such a way that this trope comes to be seen as 
pervasive and its impact decisive in economic theory. Doing so, it was argued, risks 
dissolving the very nature of metaphor by confusing it with any kind of logical 
operation just as reducing theory to simple metaphors risks stripping it of its very 
significance. 
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i The author would like to thank Andrew Connochie, Olaf DeWinter, Yves Gingras, 
Bruce Maxwell, Philippe Mongin as well as Uskali Mäki and other members of 
the Erasmus seminar in Rotterdam for their very useful observations. He is 
especially grateful to the two anonymous assessors of Economics and Philosophy  
for their detailed and thoughtful  comments. Financial assistance from the SSHRC 
(Ottawa) and the Fonds FCAR (Quebec) was also greatly appreciated.  
ii Aristotle 1457 b 6-9: " A 'metaphor' is the application [to something] of a name 
belonging to something else [...]," p. 28 in Aristotle (1987).  For a discussion of 
Aristotle's view, see Ricœur, 1977, pp. 9-43. 
iii McCloskey (1985). 
iv  Black, 1962, p. 236; see also Black (1979); for a discussion of Black's view, see 
Ricœur, 1977, pp. 83-90. 
v Mirowski (1989). For reviews that strongly object to the main theses of this book, 
see Hoover (1991) and Walker (1991). 
vi  For a philosophical analysis of this paradox, see Foucault (1983). Sadok (1979, p. 
51), discussing a problem raised by Cohen 1971, pp. 56-57, concludes that "a 
sentence such as, 'This is a flower,' said while pointing to a conglomeration of 
pigment on canvas would be, strictly speaking, false" and attributes the non-
literalness to a "metonymical intent". 
vii Klamer & Leonard, 1994, pp. 41-42 referring to Pepper (1942). 
viii In fact, it is clear that the "circulation" of money is a metaphor which is not 
borrowed from steam engineering since its use (according to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, it was already used in English in 1684) antedates the age of steam 
engine and it is far from clear that it was borrowed from medical language. 





                                                                                                                                            
However, Alborn refers explicitly to the way Victorian economists were modelling 
the circulation of money with the help of analogies drawn either from biology or 
from engineering. The "circulation" of money as such is an older metaphor which 
is ultimately  derived from the idea of a circular movement. This point illustrates 
the importance (discussed in the next section) of clearly distinguishing analogical 
models from metaphors.  
ix At most, one might claim that, since their meaning is not strictly speaking a 
primary and purely conventional meaning, dead metaphors are taken less literally 
than strictly literal utterances. They are nonetheless taken literally rather than 
metaphorically: indeed, they refer to a "relatively primary sense of a word" since 
no other term refers more directly to the specific phenomena they designate 
unambiguously in a given context. Klamer and Leonard (1994, p. 39) themselves 
seem to acknowledge the fact that most metaphors underlying economic models 
are "dead metaphors" (an expression which, according to them, was coined by 
Turbayne), but they observe that such metaphors "can be brought back to life" 
especially in the mind of "newcomers to economics and outsiders", an 
incontestable fact which, however, can hardly affect economic theory as such. 
x Black, 1979, p. 26) This Blackian sense of the word "catachresis" is defined in 
(Black, 1962, p. 33). 
xi Goodman, 1976, p. 73. The definition of a "category-mistake", which was 
proposed by Gilbert Ryle in a context unrelated to the question of metaphor, has 
been previously used (without insistence on the calculated character) to 
characterise metaphors by Collin Murray Turbayne (1970, p. 12 and p. 18). On 
this point, see Ricœur (1977, pp. 197 and 235). Philip Mirowski (1989, p. 278), 
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following Mary Hesse, seems to have adopted such an interpretation in the case of 
a poetic metaphor.  
xii As observed by Hendersen, 1998, p. 291, " 'Dead' metaphors (cliché) is the 
anticipated outcome of knowledge but not the anticipated outcome of poetry." 
xiii Theoretical models used by economists must be distinguished from those semantic 
models that for logicians and philosophers of science are models of a theory 
interpreted through them in the sense that the axiomatic theorems of the theory are 
made true under this interpretation. For an illuminating illustration of the role of 
such models, see the first chapter of Hesse (1966) who refers to them as model1. 
See also Suppe, 1977, pp. 95-102.  
xiv Iconic models of this type are akin to scale models (like scale models of an 
airplane, for example) except that — as underlined by Black (1962, pp. 222) who 
prefers to call them analogue models for this reason — they reproduce the 
structure and not the shape of what they model. Nonetheless, they must be clearly 
distinguished from what some philosophers of science also call "iconic" models in 
order to characterise any representation (like, for example, the Bohr billiard ball 
model of the atom) which is "structurally similar (isomorphic) to what it models" 
(Suppe, 1977, p. 97). This last kind of models which correspond to Hesse's model2  
(Hesse, 1966, p. 10ff.) are isomorphic to the semantic models which interpret an 
axiomatic theory (see footnote 12 above) whereas the iconic (or analogue) models 
exemplified by Philips's hydraulic model are isomorphic to theoretical models of 
the type devised by economists. Irving Fisher (1925, pp. 24 & ff.), for example, 
has constructed such an hydraulic model to represent his microeconomic theory of 
price based on marginal utility. For an account of this type of model, see Black, 
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1962, pp. 222-223 and for an analysis of Fisher's and Phillips's respective 
hydraulic models, see Lagueux (1992). 
xv  Klamer and Leonard, 1994, p. 45, define correctly "allegory" along these lines ("a 
long or extended metaphor [...]"), but their definition of "analogy" ("a sustained 
and systematically elaborated metaphor [...]") does not allow the reader to clearly 
distinguish one from the other, even if they do qualify this ambiguity by saying 
that an analogy tends to obscure its parentage with its founding metaphor, whereas 
in the case of an allegory it is the other side of the original metaphor which is 
forgotten. By contrast, I. Bernard Cohen in the same book (1994, p. 57) insists on 
clearly distinguishing analogies and metaphors. 
xvi Klamer and Leonard (1994, p. 45) seem to acknowledge this point in their 
comment on their definition of "allegory", but this does not seem to have 
consequences for the thesis in their paper.  
xvii In reality, a reduction of the flow of money will depend of the marginal rate of 
substitution between goods, but most hydraulic models do not make room for 
multiple goods.  
xviii Black (1966, pp. 219-243). See also Hesse (1966) whose last chapter was largely 
inspired by Black's theses. Black and Hesse raise highly interesting points which, 
by contrast with the present paper, concern mostly the context of discovery of a 
theory. A full and satisfactory discussion of their views would require a different 
paper, and one which would be less directly related to economics. 
xix The fact that many economists have been influenced by physics, a science in 
which they have found, in particular, various mathematical instruments 
appropriate to their own analysis, is generally admitted both by the predecessors 
and even by the critics of Mirowski (see Hoover, 1991, p. 141 and Walker, 1991, 





                                                                                                                                            
p. 628). The controversy over More Heat than Light concerns mainly the nature of 
this influence, its alleged pervasive, systematic and exceptional character, the kind 
of evidence which is acceptable to document it and its significance for the 
development of economics both in the XIXth and XXth centuries. For a more 
recent account of the influence exerted by physical and mathematical models on 
economics, see Israel (1997).  
xx This point has been usefully analysed by Cristina Bicchieri in Bicchieri (1988), 
even if the author does not seem to agree with the restrictions on the meaning of 
the word "metaphor" advocated in the present paper. The idea that mathematical 
formalism  developed in a science can be interpreted as an analogical model to be 
applied to other contexts has been often discussed by philosophers of science, 
starting at least with Hesse (1966). 
xxi Had metaphor not been given such a prominent role in recent literature, such a 
conclusion would have likely been considered too widely admitted among 
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The paper challenges the idea that the presence of metaphors substantially 
modifies crucial methodological conclusions about economic analysis. 
After denouncing the tendency to present as a metaphor any utterance 
which cannot be taken in a strictly literal sense, the paper argues that most 
of the metaphors that one finds in economics are dead metaphors which can 
hardly be distinguished from plain literal language. Then, the analogies 
involved in theoretical transfers from other sectors of science is 
disentangled from purely metaphorical processes. While acknowledging 
that tracking metaphors in economics might be worthwhile, the paper tends 
to dedramatize the methodological consequences of their alleged 
omnipresence. 
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